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INTRODUCTION 
The Taliesin estate in Spring Green, Wisconsin is an extraordinary 
design by famed architect Frank Lloyd Wright.1 The house is anything but 
expected with its unique roof line, use of natural materials, incorporation 
into the topography, and revolutionary overall look and feel. The house 
features red doors that stand in contrast to the earthy tones of the house, as 
well as exceptional window shapes and patterns that cause the eye to linger. 
The house is built on multiple levels to be in harmony with the hilly terrain. 
Sculptures and looking ponds adorn the grounds in expertly selected 
locations. The most eye-catching feature of the house is undoubtedly the 
roof line with its distinctive angles that create striking shapes.  
Architectural works such as the Taliesin create the backdrop to human 
life and are an integral piece of society’s cultural experience.2 As phones 
with camera capabilities and scanners become more sophisticated and the 
ease with which material can be downloaded from the internet becomes 
increasingly simple, however, architects face the increasingly difficult task of 
trying “to prevent unauthorized copying of their work.”3 The Taliesin—or 
perhaps more precisely, Wright—deserves protection against unauthorized, 
unlawful copiers.4 The protections against unlawful copying of architectural 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2015, by LAUREN BRADBERRY. 
 1. Frank Lloyd Wright was a visionary in the field of architecture favoring a new, 
American spirit in architecture over the historic, imported European styles. See, e.g., 
Frank Lloyd Wright’s Taliesin Celebrates 100 Years, ARCHITECTURAL REC. (April 22, 
2011), http://archrecord.construction.com/news/2011/04/110422-Taliesin.asp. For this 
discussion, it might be useful to view pictures of Taliesin, Wright’s self-designed home 
in Wisconsin, which are available on a variety of websites. See, e.g., Travel United 
States: Taliesin Residence, D. HOLMES CHAMBERLIN JR. ARCHITECT LLC, http://www 
.dchamberlinarchitect.com/travel-north%20america-united%20states-wisconsin- 
spring%20green-taliesin-FLW%20HOME.htm [http://perma.cc/62H3-9Y6U] (last 
revised July 2011).  
 2. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 12 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
6935, 6943 (quoting Frank Lloyd Wright as saying: “Buildings will always remain 
the most valuable aspect in a people’s environment, the one most capable of cultural 
reaction”); see also MARIAN MOFFETT, MICHAEL W. FAZIO & LAWRENCE 
WODEHOUSE, A WORLD HISTORY OF ARCHITECTURE 1 (2003) (“[T]he best of 
[architecture] expresses the tastes and aspirations of the entire society.”).  
 3. Richard M. McDermott & Jason M. Sneed, What Every Architect Should 
Know About Copyright Law: Practice Matters, ARCHITECTURAL REC., https://arch 
record.construction.com/practice/pdfs/0401copyrightlaw.pdf (last visited Aug. 19, 
2015) (“[P]eople are more disrespectful than ever of laws intended to protect 
intellectual property.”).  
 4. The infringement analysis and scope of the protection analysis are 
intertwined. The threshold question for infringement includes whether the work 
is within the scope of protection dictated by the Copyright Act. See Charles W. 
Ross Builder, Inc. v. Olsen Fine Home Bldg., LLC, 827 F. Supp. 2d 607, 618 
(E.D. Va. 2011) (“The threshold questions with respect to the substantial 
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works are found in the 1990 Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act 
(“AWCPA”).5 The AWCPA amended the section of the Copyright Act on 
subject matter to include “architectural works” within its scope,6 and it 
also added an expansive definition of those works.7 The definition 
supplied in the AWCPA states that “[a]n ‘architectural work’ is the design 
of a building . . . includ[ing] the overall form as well as the arrangement 
and composition of spaces and elements in the design.”8 With such a broad 
definition of an architectural work, it seems obvious that a home as 
original as the Taliesin estate would receive protection from unlawful 
copying. Neither Congress nor the courts, however, have proffered a test 
that would offer copyright protection to the Taliesin for fear of hindering 
progress and competition in the field.9  
This Comment examines the three most widely recognized tests for 
the scope of architectural copyright protection: Congress’s “non-
functionality” test, the Eleventh Circuit’s “categorization” test, and the 
Second Circuit’s “dissection test.” The House Report on the AWCPA 
explains the congressional test.10 This Comment labels that test as the 
“non-functionality test.” The non-functionality test determines whether 
design elements of an architectural work are functional or aesthetic11 and 
is difficult to apply to a complex work like the Taliesin, which has intrinsic 
utilitarian value and intertwines artful design with the functional aspects 
                                                                                                             
similarity inquiry are, therefore, twofold: first, what is the nature and extent of 
protection, if any, owed to Plaintiff under the Copyright Act; and second, which 
components, if any, of Plaintiff’s work are original and thereby entitled to 
protection under the Act?”). This Comment focuses on the initial question of 
whether the work is protected under the Copyright Act but necessarily discusses 
the infringement standard for a full analysis of the scope of protection. 
 5. Congress added protection for architectural works to comply with Berne 
Convention standards, a World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) 
administered treaty. H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 20–21, reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6951–52. Copyright protection gives the owner the exclusive 
right to reproduce the copyrighted work, to prepare derivative works, and to 
distribute copies of the copyrighted work for a limited period of time. 17 U.S.C. 
§ 106 (2012). 
 6. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(8) (2012). 
 7. Id. 
 8. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 9. Despite the expansive definition in the AWCPA, the overall trend in the 
courts is to provide buildings with “thin” protection. David E. Shipley, The 
Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act at Twenty: Has Full Protection 
Made A Difference?, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 6 (2010); Satava v. Lowry, 323 
F.3d 805, 812 (9th Cir. 2003) (“‘[T]hin’ copyright[s] . . . protect[] against only 
virtually identical copying.”).  
 10. H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 20–21, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 
6951–52. 
 11. Id. (“If [original] design elements are present, a second step is reached to 
examine whether the design elements are functionally required.”). 
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of its elements. The Eleventh Circuit’s test categorically defines the scope 
of protection by labeling all architectural works as “compilations.”12 This 
Comment refers to the Eleventh Circuit’s test as the “categorical test,” 
which may often produce agreeable results—especially in the case of 
mundane or unoriginal buildings—but could also cause a court to overlook 
original aspects of a sophisticated work for copyright protection.13 Finally, 
this Comment labels the Second Circuit’s test as the “dissection test.” The 
dissection test requires mental dissection of the elements of the work and 
separate analysis of each element for copyright protection.14 This test best 
avoids over-protecting unoriginal works and rests on established principles 
of copyright law, such as scènes-à-faire and the merger doctrine. However, 
the test is not without flaws and may produce unwanted results if not applied 
carefully.  
For instance, a haphazard application of the dissection test to complex 
works such as the Taliesin could leave its most defining features, including 
its overall form, unprotected. If strictly applied, the dissection test would not 
protect the unique doors and windows of the home. Because all houses have 
doors and windows, the dissection analysis would place all doors and 
windows in the public domain.15 Wright’s use of varying levels would not 
qualify for protection for the same reason that makes this technique 
unique—the topography dictated the varying levels.16 The pond designs and 
placements could be denied protection as merely a preference of the 
consumer.17 Even the roof line, the most stunning feature of the house, is 
likely to be unprotected under a mechanical application of the dissection test 
because engineering design constraints dictated the specific angles of the 
                                                                                                             
 12. See Intervest Constr., Inc. v. Canterbury Estates Homes, Inc., 554 F.3d 
914, 919 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 13. Originality is a core requirement for copyright. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. 
Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (“The sine qua non of copyright 
is originality.”).  
 14. Zalewski v. Cicero Builder Dev., Inc., 754 F.3d 95, 106 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 15. See id. (“Plaintiff can get no credit for putting a closet in every bedroom, 
a fireplace in the middle of an exterior wall, and kitchen counters against the 
kitchen walls.”). “The concept of the public domain is another import from the 
realm of real property. In the intellectual property context, the term describes a 
true commons comprising elements of intellectual property that are ineligible for 
private ownership.” Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 975 
(1990) (internal citations omitted). The lay understanding of the public domain in 
the copyright context is “that it contains works free from copyright.” Id. (citing 
WEBSTER’S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1836 (1986)). 
 16. See, e.g., Sparaco v. Lawler, Matusky, Skelly, Eng’rs LLP, 303 F.3d 460, 
467 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 17. See, e.g., Zalewski, 754 F.3d at 106 (“Constraints placed on an architect by 
the way her client plans to use the building do not originate with the architect.”). 
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roof.18 Missing throughout this entire process is protection of the overall 
form.19 Despite relying on sound copyright doctrine, the Second Circuit’s 
dissection method could lead to these undesirable results if inattentively 
applied.  
Although unauthorized copiers may be rejoicing, the underpinnings of 
copyright are being neglected by all three of the tests. Blindly categorizing 
or dissecting architecture leaves the judge with a heap of mangled doors, 
windows, columns, and walls with no protection, ignoring the expansive 
definition of architecture. Courts should put the house back together again 
by examining the work as a whole first, instead of as dissected solitary 
features. Courts should then apply a careful dissection analysis to protect 
any individual, original elements of the design. Otherwise, the courts will 
deny protection in a categorical fashion for architectural works and allow 
unlawful copying to occur.  
Part I of this Comment presents the background of the AWCPA and the 
current judicial treatment of AWCPA claims. Part II explores the 
inadequacies of the congressional and judicial tests for scope of copyright 
protection for architectural works. Part III examines sui generis protection 
for other inherently functional works and the judicial treatment when 
determining the scope of protection in those areas. Finally, Part IV proposes 
a workable test that courts can use to determine the scope of copyright 
protection for architectural works. This test uses a modified version of the 
Second Circuit’s dissection test to ensure that courts do not pass over 
original large-scale groupings of elements and original overall form for 
copyright protection.  
I. PRE-AWCPA COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR 
ARCHITECTURAL WORKS 
Some of the most extraordinary cities in the world have become 
synonymous with the architectural works they house—Dubai’s Khalifa 
Tower, Rome’s Colosseum, and Washington D.C.’s Capitol building, to name 
a few. Architecture does not merely conjure images for the back of a postcard; 
                                                                                                             
 18. See, e.g., Harvester, Inc. v. Rule Joy Trammell Rubio, LLC, 716 F. Supp. 
2d 428, 441 (E.D. Va. 2010) (“Therefore, any decisions on arrangement and 
coordination made . . . that were dictated by the building code and manufacturers’ 
clearance directives cannot be protected expression, as they would not be original 
. . . .”). 
 19. The “overall form,” as used in this Comment, is in contrast to individual 
standard features. It is meant to include the arrangement and composition of 
spaces and elements that create the complete look and feel of the building. See 17 
U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
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rather, architecture can define entire eras and cultures.20 Despite being a 
cultural backbone of society, architectural works did not receive protection 
under federal copyright law until 1990 when Congress passed the AWCPA.21  
A. The Standard for Copyright Protection is an Exceedingly Easy Hurdle 
to Overcome 
Long before the AWCPA amended the Copyright Act to protect 
architectural works, copyright law developed with a standard of protection 
that flowed from the Constitution.22 The Constitution grants Congress 
broad powers to create copyright law, stating that Congress may “secur[e] 
for limited times to authors . . . the exclusive right to their respective 
Writings” to “promote the progress of science and useful arts.”23 The 
constitutional provision itself does not expressly articulate a specific 
standard for when courts should give a writing by an author exclusive 
rights, but two decisions from the Supreme Court in the late nineteenth 
century held that the constitutional standard for copyright protection 
required some degree of originality.24 The originality requirement 
articulated in these two early cases remains the touchstone of copyright 
law today.25 The Supreme Court elaborated upon this standard by 
requiring “only that the work was independently created by the author (as 
opposed to copied from other works), and that it possesses at least some 
minimal degree of creativity.”26 The Court emphasized that originality is 
                                                                                                             
 20. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 12 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
6935, 6943; MOFFETT ET AL., supra note 2, at 1. 
 21. Compare 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102 (1976), with 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102(a)(8) 
(1990); see also H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 20, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
6935, 6951 (“This provision . . . create[s] a new category of protected subject 
matter: ‘architectural works.’”). Congress added protection for architectural 
works to comply with Berne Convention standards, a WIPO administered treaty. 
Id. at 6937.  
 22. Copyright law was discussed in cases as early as 1789. See, e.g., Hudson 
v. Patten, 1 Root 133 (Conn. 1789). One of the earliest discussions of copyright 
by the Supreme Court was in 1834. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834). 
 23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 206 
(1954). The comments to the House Report state that “the design of a work of 
architecture is a ‘writing’ under the Constitution and fully deserves protection 
under the Copyright Act.” H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 13, reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6944.  
 24. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991) 
(discussing the Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879) and Burrow-Giles 
Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884)). 
 25. Id. at 347 (“[Originality] is the very ‘premise of copyright law.’” (quoting 
Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1368 (5th Cir. 1981))). 
 26. Id. at 345. Feist condensed and reinforced the originality standard 
jurisprudence and was decided, coincidentally, a year after Congress passed the 
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an exceedingly low bar and requires only a “spark” of creativity.27 Even if 
two works are substantially similar to one another, as long as the 
similarities are fortuitous and each author independently creates his or her 
own work demonstrating a spark of creativity, then copyright protection is 
not barred under originality for either work.28 Most works clear the low 
bar of originality without much difficulty.  
In addition to being original, the work must be of a subject matter that 
Congress has deemed suitable for copyright protection.29 The Copyright Act 
defines copyright subject matter in two ways: by listing certain categories of 
works that could be protected by copyright and by expressly precluding certain 
categories of works from copyright protection.30 According to Congress, the 
types of works that are eligible for copyright protection include the following: 
literary, musical, dramatic, choreographic, pictorial, graphic, and sculptural 
works; motion pictures; sound recordings; and architecture.31 Conversely, 
Congress stated that “in no case does copyright protection for an original work 
of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of 
operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it 
is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”32 Protection for 
these items falls under patent law, if protected at all.33 This subject matter 
distinction is generally known as the “idea/expression dichotomy,” and is a 
difficult line to draw.34  
                                                                                                             
AWCPA. Id. The Court also banished the “sweat of the brow” doctrine that some 
lower courts had used to award copyrights when an author expended large 
amounts of effort. Id. at 359–60. The Court rejected this doctrine, emphasizing 
again that the standard for copyright protection is originality—not level of effort. 
See Feist for a further discussion on the flaws of the “sweat of the brow” doctrine. 
Id. at 353–56. 
 27. See id. at 345 (“To be sure, the requisite level of creativity is extremely 
low; even a slight amount will suffice. The vast majority of works make the grade 
quite easily, as they possess some creative spark, ‘no matter how crude, humble 
or obvious’ it might be.” (quoting 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.08(C)(1) (1990))). 
 28. See id. at 345–46 (“Originality does not signify novelty . . . . [A]ssume 
that two poets, each ignorant of the other, compose identical poems. Neither work 
is novel, yet both are original and, hence, copyrightable.”). 
 29. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. § 102(b); see also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954); Kunycia 
v. Melville Realty Co., 755 F. Supp. 566, 570 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (“[T]he specific 
means chosen by an author to express certain ideas or facts may be copyrighted, 
as opposed to the idea itself.”). 
 33. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102–03 (1880) (holding that copyright 
protection is given only to the expression of the idea, not the idea itself).  
 34. See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349–
50 (1991) (“[C]opyright assures authors the right to their original expression, but 
encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by a 
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Two judicially-created doctrines based on the idea/expression 
dichotomy—scènes-à-faire and merger—have become accepted in 
copyright law.35 The doctrine of scènes-à-faire is applicable if an element 
of a design is so associated with a particular type of work that it becomes 
indispensable or standard in the treatment of that work.36 Therefore, the 
element would not receive copyright protection.37 For example, cowboys, 
bank robbers, and shootouts in a Western movie would get no protection 
because the work would be incomplete without those elements.38 
Relatedly, the merger doctrine recognizes that “some ideas can only be 
expressed in a limited number of ways—single words or colors for 
example. When expression is so limited, idea and expression ‘merge.’”39 
An author cannot own the idea itself, and thus courts cannot protect the 
expression.40 The courts applied the scènes-à-faire and merger doctrines 
to expand the copyright analysis to new categories as Congress expanded 
the list of copyrightable subject matter.41 
                                                                                                             
work. This principle, known as the idea/expression or fact/expression dichotomy, 
applies to all works of authorship.” (internal citation omitted)); see also Peter Pan 
Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960) (“Obviously, 
no principle can be stated as to when an imitator has gone beyond copying the ‘idea,’ 
and has borrowed its ‘expression.’ Decisions must therefore inevitably be ad hoc.”).  
 35. Several examples of courts making use of the copyright doctrines scènes-
à-faire and merger exist. See, e.g., Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control 
Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 535 (6th Cir. 2004); Assessment Techs. of Wis., 
LLC v. WIREdata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640, 643 (7th Cir. 2003); Ets-Hokin v. Skyy 
Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1082 (9th Cir. 2000); Kregos v. Associated Press, 
937 F.2d 700, 705–07 (2d Cir. 1991); Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. 
Supp. 2d 444, 455 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); see also Adam T. Mow, Architect, Building 
with Style: Testing the Boundaries of Architectural Works Copyright Protection 
Act, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 853, 868 (discussing scènes-à-faire and its application in 
architecture). 
 36. See, e.g., Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 979 (2d 
Cir. 1980) (“Because it is virtually impossible to write about a particular . . . theme 
without employing certain ‘stock’ or standard literary devices, we have held that 
scenes a faire [sic] are not copyrightable as a matter of law.”); see generally 1 
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03(B)(4) 
(1998) (discussing the doctrine of scènes-à-faire and its application to architecture).  
 37. See supra note 36. 
 38. See Zalewski v. Cicero Builder Dev., Inc., 754 F.3d 95, 102 (2d Cir. 
2014). 
 39. Id. at 102–03; see Assessment Techs. of Wis., 350 F.3d at 643; Ets-Hokin, 
225 F.3d at 1082; Kregos, 937 F.2d at 705–07.  
 40. Zalewski, 754 F.3d at 102–03; see also Baker v. Seldon, 101 U.S. 99 
(1880). 
 41. The Supreme Court recognized the legislative intent to expand the 
definition of a copyrightable work when the words were reduced from “work of 
fine art” to “work of art” in the copyright statute. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 
213 (1954). The Court noted that this change suggested that “there is subject-
matter (for instance, of applied design, not yet within the province of design 
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B. Pre-AWCPA Architectural Works Were Only Protected as Non-
Utilitarian Sculptures that Passed the Conceptual Separability Test 
Congress did not include architecture in the list of approved subject 
matters for copyright protection until 1990, when Congress passed the 
AWCPA.42 Before 1990, Congress afforded architectural plans copyright 
under the pictorial or graphic work categories but did not plainly protect the 
physical product of those plans, such as buildings, under a subject matter 
category.43 Although not explicit in the Act, architectural works most aptly 
fit under the “sculptural work” category. According to the Copyright Act, if 
a sculptural work has a specific function or use that is not “merely to portray 
the appearance of the article or to convey information,” that work is 
designated as a “useful article.”44 Architectural works seem to fit under the 
category of a sculptural work designed for a specific function—sheltering 
people or things—and courts often categorized these works as useful articles 
under the pre-AWCPA regime.45  
The Copyright Act excludes useful articles from copyright protection 
because excessively lengthy monopolies over functional works can halt 
progress in the sciences and fair competition.46 To ensure that no functional 
                                                                                                             
patents), which may properly be entitled to protection under the copyright law.” 
Id. at 213 (quoting To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright: 
Hearing on S. 6330 and H.R. 19853 Before Committees on Patents of the Senate 
and House of Representatives, 59 CONG. REC. 11 (1906) (statement by Herbert 
Putnam, Librarian of Congress)).  
 42. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 19 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
6935, 6951 (“This provision . . . create[s] a new category of protected subject 
matter: ‘architectural works.’”). 
 43. See Zalewski, 754 F.3d at 100 (“When Congress passed the Copyright 
Act of 1976, architectural works were not among the listed categories . . . .”).  
 44. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). Congress lumped pictorial, graphic, or sculptural 
works (“PGS works”) together in the Copyright Act. The Act specifically states 
that: 
“Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works” . . . shall include works of 
artistic craftsmanship insofar as their form but not their mechanical or 
utilitarian aspects are concerned; the design of a useful article, as defined 
in this section, shall be considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work 
only if, and only to the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial, 
graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and 
are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the 
article. 
Id. Examples of useful articles include cars, food processors, and television sets. 
Leicester v. Warner Bros., 232 F.3d 1212, 1217 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 45. See Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1143 
(2d Cir. 1987) (discussing the then-current view of architecture as a “pictorial, 
sculpture, or graphic” work). 
 46. This reason is why the duration of a patent is often five times shorter than 
the duration for a copyright—to ensure fair competition and to promote progress. 
276 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76 
 
 
 
work is inadvertently covered under copyright, the courts apply the so called 
“separability test” to useful articles, including sculptural works.47 The 
separability test states that “[u]nless the shape of an . . . industrial product 
contains some element that, physically or conceptually, can be identified as 
separable from the utilitarian aspects of that article, the design would not be 
copyrighted.”48 This test is simple to apply if the art can be physically 
separated from the useful article. For example, in Mazer v. Stein,49 the artist 
fitted a statue of a dancer with a light bulb and lampshade, creating a lamp.50 
The Court held that the statues themselves were copyrightable works of art: 
“The patentability of the statue[s], fitted as lamps or unfitted, [did] not bar 
copyright as works of art.”51 The more difficult question is whether the art 
can be conceptually separated from the useful article. 
                                                                                                             
Compare 17 U.S.C. § 302 (life of the author and 70 years after the author’s death 
for copyright), with 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012) (20 years from the filing date for 
utility patents); see generally David E. Shipley, Copyright Protection for 
Architectural Works, 37 S.C. L. REV. 393, 396 n.9 (1986) (“[A] tension in 
copyright law results from the attempt to balance two competing policies: 
providing incentives for authors to create and protecting the public’s interest in 
access to and use of intellectual creations.”). 
 47. H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 11, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 
6942. The report states:  
The current U.S. Copyright Act expressly includes diagrams, models, 
and technical drawings, including architectural plans as a species of 
protected pictorial, graphic, and sculptural work. It does not, however, 
expressly protect works of architecture, although this Committee’s 
Report accompanying the 1976 Copyright Act contemplated that at least 
selected works of architecture—those containing elements physically or 
conceptually separable from their utilitarian function—would be 
protected to the extent of their separability.  
Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also, Brandir Int’l, 834 F.2d at 
1145 (discussing the separability test as applied to a useful article: “If design 
elements reflect merger of aesthetic and functional considerations, the artistic 
aspects of work cannot be said to be conceptually separable from utilitarian 
elements, and thus the work is not copyrightable. But where design elements can 
be identified as reflecting designer’s artistic judgment exercised independently of 
functional influences, the work may be copyrightable.”). 
 48. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 55 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5659, 5668 (“[C]opyright protection would extend only to [separable works of 
art], and would not cover the over-all configuration of the utilitarian article as 
such.”); see also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“[T]he design of a useful article, as defined in 
this section, shall be considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and 
only to the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural 
features that can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing 
independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.”).  
 49. 347 U.S. 201 (1954). 
 50. Id. at 203. 
 51. Id. at 217. 
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One court described the conceptual separability test as an inquiry into the 
design constraints placed on the author.52 If utilitarian concerns significantly 
influenced the conception of the article, the aesthetic elements are so 
interwoven within the useful article as to become conceptually inseparable 
from the utilitarian aspects, which are not afforded copyright protection.53  
Under the pre-AWCPA regime, because architectural works were 
considered under the sculptural works category and necessarily labeled as 
useful articles based on their intrinsic functionality, courts could only protect 
those works if the design passed the conceptual separability test.54 Although 
Congress meant to draw a bright line between copyrightable art and non-
copyrightable functional works with the separability test, courts have had 
difficulty determining conceptual separability.55 Conceptual separability is 
                                                                                                             
 52. Brandir Int’l, 834 F.2d at 1143. Other circuits have followed this 
approach. See Pivot Point Int’l, Inc. v. Charlene Prods., 372 F.3d 913 (7th Cir. 
2004); Universal Furniture Int’l, Inc. v. Collezione Europa USA, Inc., 618 F.3d 
417 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 53. Brandir Int’l, 834 F.2d at 1147. Brandir involved a bike rack that 
consisted of a curved pipe resembling a sound wave. Id. at 1146 (“[T]he original 
design . . . stemmed from wire sculptures . . . , each formed from one continuous 
undulating piece of wire.”). The court held that although “the rack may have been 
derived in part from one of more ‘works of art,’ it is in its final form essentially a 
product of industrial design.” Id. The designer “clearly adapted the original 
aesthetic elements to accommodate and further a utilitarian purpose.” Id. 
 54. See supra note 48. 
 55. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 55, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 
5668; Brandir Int’l, 834 F.2d at 1143 (“[T]he line Congress attempted to draw 
between copyrightable art and noncopyrightable design ‘was neither clear nor 
new.’” (quoting Robert C. Denicola, Applied Art and Industrial Design: A 
Suggested Approach to Copyright in Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L. REV. 707, 741 
(1983))). For an example, see Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 
applying the test to belt buckles as a utilitarian article and finding that the 
ornamental surfaces of buckles were not required for their function. 632 F.2d 989, 
994 (2d Cir. 1980) (“It will, so long as the statute remains in its present form, 
always be necessary to determine whether in a given case there is a physically or 
conceptually separable artistic sculpture or carving capable of existing 
independently as a work of art. (emphasis added)”). The dissent summarized the 
effects of the separablity test, stating that, although the belt buckles were 
“admirable aesthetically pleasing examples of modern design” and that the judges 
were “offended by the flagrant copying of another’s work,” the buckles remained 
“inseparable from the important function they serve—helping to keep the tops of 
trousers at waist level” and until the law was changed, the court should not “twist 
the law in order to achieve a result Congress has denied.” Id. at 994 (Weinstien, 
J., dissenting); see also Norris Indus. v. Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 696 F.2d 918 (11th 
Cir. 1983) (automobile wire wheel covers not conceptually separable); Carol 
Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985) (the form of 
anatomically correct human torsos “inextricably intertwined with the utilitarian 
feature” of displaying clothes); Animal Fair, Inc. v. Amfesco Indus., Inc., 620 F. 
Supp. 175, 186–88 (D. Minn. 1985) (bear-paw design conceptually separable 
from utilitarian feature of a slipper).  
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especially difficult to apply in the case of architecture, which presents 
complex works with intrinsic utilitarian value.56 As a practical matter, the 
separability test would not protect the most sophisticated architectural works. 
Attempting to define a building as “purely non-functional” or “separable” is 
illogical, because buildings are designed to shelter people or things. Defining 
a building as purely non-functional would deny copyright protection to 
architects who infuse artistic expression into functional building designs as an 
inseparable aspect of the design, while granting protection to those “who attach 
their independent representational art, or even their trite gimmickry, to a useful 
object for purposes of enhancement.”57  
When Congress passed the AWCPA, it noted the courts’ difficulties in 
applying the conceptual separability test and the injustice its application to 
architectural works presented.58 Congress cited the judicial disagreement over 
the precise test for separability and concerns over “entangling architectural 
works in [the] disagreement” as reason enough for providing architecture with 
its own category of copyrightable subject matter.59 This new protection for 
architectural works replaced the previous protection sometimes provided under 
the conceptual separability test for non-utilitarian sculptures incorporated into 
a work of architecture. Congress stated in the House Report that:  
By creating a new category of protect[able] subject matter in new 
section 102(a)(8), and, therefore, by deliberately not encompassing 
architectural works as pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works in 
existing section 102(a)(5), the copyrightability of architectural 
works shall not be evaluated under the separability test applicable 
to pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works embodied in useful 
articles.60 
                                                                                                             
 56. The House report to the 1976 Copyright Act noted that architectural 
works presented a “special situation” in that plans and drawings would be 
protected as pictorial, graphic, or sculpture works, “but the extent to which that 
protection would extend to the structure depicted would depend on the 
circumstances.” H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 55, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5659, 5668. Therefore, under the separability test, the only “circumstances” that 
allowed protection for architectural works included “[p]urely non-functional or 
monumental structures” that were either conceptually or physically separable 
from the architectural structure itself. Id. A gargoyle on the ledge of a building is 
an apt example.  
 57. Kieselstein-Cord, 632 F.2d at 994. 
 58. H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 19 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
6935, 6951; see NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 36, § 2.08(D)(2)(b); Shipley, 
supra note 46, at 422–23 (discussing the pitfalls of the separability test as applied 
to architecture). 
 59. H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 20, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 
6951. 
 60. Id. 
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Thus, the AWCPA expressly excludes the concept of separability from the 
copyright analysis for architectural works.  
II. THE AWCPA, CONGRESSIONAL INTENT, AND COURTS’ TREATMENT  
Congress included architectural works as a copyrightable subject 
matter in the AWCPA.61 When enacting the statute, it formulated a test 
that would ensure that no functional aspects of an architectural work were 
protected.62 Subsequently, two federal circuit courts—the Eleventh and 
Second Circuits—developed tests that are similar to Congress’s non-
functionality test, but that diverge on the scope of copyright protection for 
architectural works.63 
A. The AWCPA and the Broad Definition of Architectural Works 
In 1990, Congress enacted the AWCPA in response to standards set forth 
in the Berne Convention, an international treaty that the United States had 
recently signed to extend copyright protection beyond the separable elements 
of an architectural work.64 Congress then requested the Copyright Office to 
conduct a report on the then-current status of copyright protection for 
architecture compared to Berne standards.65 The office’s report stated that 
“while architectural blueprints, plans, drawings, and models relating to works 
of architecture [were] adequately protected by U[nited] S[tates] copyright 
law,” the protection for the actual design product—the constructed structure—
was “in doubt.”66 As a response to these findings, and in an attempt to 
“stimulate excellence in [architectural] design, thereby enriching [the] 
public environment in keeping with the constitutional goal,” Congress 
                                                                                                             
 61. See infra Part II.A. 
 62. See infra Part II.A. 
 63. See infra Part II.B. 
 64. H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 19, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 
6951 (“The sole purpose of legislating at this time is to place the United States 
unequivocally in compliance with its Berne Convention obligations.”); see also 
Zalewski v. Cicero Builder Dev., Inc., 754 F.3d 95, 100 (2d Cir. 2014) (“In the 
1980s, however, Congress started the lengthy process of updating the Copyright 
Act in order to join the Berne Convention, an international agreement that governs 
copyright protection.”). The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works is a World Intellectual Property Organization administered treaty. 
See World Intellectual Property Organization, Berne Convention for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, arts. 2, 4, Sept. 18, 1979, 828 U.N.T.S. 
221, available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/text.jsp?file_id=283698#P105 
_16290 [http://perma.cc/YH2E-44EL]. The treaty states that certain literary and 
artistic works, including “works of architecture,” must enjoy protection in 
participating countries. Id. 
 65. H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 6, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6937. 
 66. See id. 
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extended protection to architectural works.67 An “architectural work,” a 
new category of copyrightable subject matter, “includes the overall form as 
well as the arrangement and composition of spaces and elements in the 
design.”68 The Act does not define the word “building,”69 but the House 
Report stated that the term “encompassed habitable structures such as 
houses and office buildings” and “structures that are used, but not inhabited, 
by human beings, such as churches, pergolas, gazebos, and garden 
pavilions.”70 The Act also does not define “overall form” and leaves it to the 
courts to decipher the exact meaning.71 Finally, Congress included the 
phrase “arrangement and composition of spaces and elements” in the 
definition of an architectural work, because “creativity in architecture 
frequently takes the form of a selection, coordination, or arrangement of 
unprotect[able] elements into an original, protect[able] whole.”72  
To limit copyright protection for architectural works, Congress 
expressly precluded “standard features” as copyrightable subject matter 
under the AWCPA, which mirrors the copyright doctrine of scénes-á-
faire.73 The House Report gave the following examples of standard 
                                                                                                             
 67. Id. at 6951; see also 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102(a)(8) (1990). Congress created 
this new category specifically removing architecture from the separability test that 
defines pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works. See supra Part I.B.  
 68. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). “The definition provides three examplars of such 
a tangible medium of expression—‘a building, architectural plans, or drawings’—
although these are not the only possible media of expression.” T-Peg, Inc. v. Vt. 
Timber Works, Inc., 459 F.3d 97, 109 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101). 
 69. See 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 70. H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 20, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 
6951. In litigation, “buildings” have taken multiple forms. See Miller’s Ale 
House, Inc. v. Boynton Carolina Ale House, LLC, 702 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2012) 
(restaurant); Intervest Constr., Inc. v. Canterbury Estates Homes, Inc., 554 F.3d 
914 (11th Cir. 2008) (house); Shine v. Childs, 382 F. Supp. 2d 602 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005) (skyscraper); Chirco v. Rosewood Vill., LLC, 03-CV-72145-DT, 2005 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 43748 (E.D. Mich. 2005) (condominiums). 
 71. See 17 U.S.C. § 101; Oravec v. Sunny Isles Luxury Ventures L.C., 469 
F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1170 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (comparing the overall forms of 
buildings). 
 72. H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 18, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 
6949 (“[A]n architect may incorporate new, protect[able] design elements into 
otherwise standard, unprotect[able] building features. . . .”). 
 73. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“An ‘architectural work’ . . . does not include individual 
standard features.”); see also 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (“In no case does copyright 
protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, 
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless 
of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such 
work.”). For an example of the court denying protection for “standard features” 
see Oravec, 527 F.3d at 1227 (“[T]he use of rounded building ends, a constant 
radius on individual floor plans . . . a central fountain, and a rooftop pool with 
landscape elements—are best characterized as either individual standard features 
or ideas.”). 
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features: “common windows, doors, and other staple building components.”74 
The courts have augmented the range of standard features to include 
architectural elements dictated by consumer preferences,75 industry 
standards,76 or existing features of the building or land.77 The House Report 
does point out that the exclusion of standard features does not automatically 
exclude all individual features.78 Courts are free to find protection for 
individual features “that reflect the erchitect’s [sic] creativity.”79 Congress 
sought, in adopting the AWCPA, to protect only those features of architectural 
works “that reflect the architect’s creativity, while excluding from the 
Copyright Act any unoriginal features, the protection of which would impede, 
rather than promote, the progress of architectural innovation.”80 
                                                                                                             
 74. H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 18, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6949. 
 75. Examples of elements-based consumer preferences may include the 
following: “separation of master suite from secondary bedrooms; minimum 2-car 
garage; four total bedrooms and three total bathrooms; laundry or mud room 
convenient to garage; pre-fabricated fireplace; . . . all-brick exterior.” Homes v. 
Ala. Heritage Homes, Inc., 929 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1249 (N.D. Ala. 2013) 
(numbering omitted); see also Zalewski v. Cicero Builder Dev., Inc., 754 F.3d 95, 
106 (2d Cir. 2014); Harvester, Inc. v. Rule Joy Trammell Rubio, LLC, 716 F. 
Supp. 2d 428, 441 (E.D. Va. 2010) (“Such market demands in the instant case might 
include the expectations and design tastes of the prospective consumers . . . 
particularly with respect to the chosen amenities and size and number of rooms in 
each space.”). 
 76. Examples of elements based on industry standards include: “relatively 
square plan to reduce material and labor costs; relatively few French doors, in 
favor of more economical fixed or sash windows; room dimensions that require 
standard, economical lumber spans and stud heights; simple, centralized roof 
geometry; [and] consistent, standard window sizes and head heights.” Homes, 929 
F. Supp. 2d at 1237–38 (numbering omitted); see also  Peter F. Gaito Architecture, 
LLC v. Simone Dev. Corp., 602 F.3d 57, 68 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[B]ecause plaintiff’s 
architectural plans ‘consisted only of generalized ideas and concepts pertaining to 
the placement of elements, traffic flow, and engineering strategies’ . . . no 
copyright infringement had occurred.” (quoting Attia v. Soc’y of the N.Y. Hosp., 
201 F.3d 50, 57 (2d Cir. 1999))); Harvester, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 441 (“Therefore, 
any decisions on arrangement and coordination . . . that were dictated by the 
building code and manufacturers’ clearance directives cannot be protected 
expression . . . .”). 
 77. See Harvester, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 442 (“Thus, any selection, 
coordination, and arrangement decisions that were dictated solely by existing 
building conditions cannot be protected expression . . . .”); see also Zalewski, 754 
F.3d at 105 (“Topography is an un-copyrightable ‘fact.’”). 
 78. H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 18, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 
6949. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Savant Homes, Inc. v. Collins, No. 13-CV-2049-WJM-MEH, 2015 WL 
899302, at *3 (D. Colo. Feb. 27, 2015) (internal citations omitted).  
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B. Applying the Abstract Standards for Scope of Protection in 
Infringement Claim Cases 
The AWCPA creates the outer boundaries for the scope of protection 
for architectural works by ensuring application of the originality standard 
and removing architecture out from under the separability analysis. Practical 
application of copyright protection to architectural works is difficult, 
however. Rather than being determined in a vacuum, infringement claims 
cases jurisprudentially define questions of scope. The standard for 
infringement is the practical check for the wide scope of protection offered 
under the AWCPA. Copyright infringement requires (1) ownership of a 
valid copyright and (2) copying of original elements of the work.81 Because 
actual copying is, in many cases, difficult to prove, a plaintiff may establish 
copying indirectly by showing (1) that the defendant had access to the 
copyrighted work and (2) that substantial similarity exists between the 
copyrighted work and the infringing work.82 To prove access, the plaintiff 
must show that the defendant had an opportunity to view or copy the 
work.83 To prove substantial similarity, the plaintiff must establish that “an 
average lay observer would recognize the alleged copy as having been 
appropriated from the copyrighted work.”84 Congress and two federal 
circuit courts have created three alternative tests that attempt to apply the 
abstract standard to copyright infringement cases involving architectural 
works.  
1. Congress’s Non-Functionality Test  
In an effort to clearly define the line between unlawful copying and 
permissible copying, Congress proffered a two-step test for determining 
the copyrightability of an architectural work85—the “non-funcationality” 
test. First, the test asks “whether there are original design elements present, 
including overall shape and interior architecture.”86 Originality is a 
prerequisite for copyright protection; if either an individual element or the 
                                                                                                             
 81. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991).  
 82. See, e.g., Charles W. Ross Builder, Inc. v. Olsen Fine Home Bldg., LLC, 
827 F. Supp. 2d 607, 617 (E.D. Va. 2011). 
 83. See Bldg. Graphics, Inc. v. Lennar Corp., 708 F.3d 573, 577–78 (4th Cir. 
2013) (“The mere possibility of such an opportunity is not enough. It must be 
reasonably possible that the defendant had access to the copyrighted work.”). 
 84. Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, Inc., 684 F.2d 821, 829 
(11th Cir. 1982) (quoting Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 911 
(2d Cir. 1980)).  
 85. H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 19 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
6935, 6951. 
 86. Id. at 20. 
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overall design of the work is original to the architect, protection may exist for 
the original element or design.87 The second question is whether those original 
design elements “are functionally required.”88 If the design elements are not 
functionally required, the work is protectable “without regard to physical or 
conceptual separability.”89 The House Report does not expressly provide for 
the result if the elements are functional; whether the elements, and thus the 
entire work, are precluded from copyright protection or whether some other 
test should apply is unclear.90  
The real question of scope falls in the hands of the courts.91 Despite the 
guiding definitions in the AWCPA and the non-functionality test from 
Congress, courts have struggled with creating a workable test for the scope of 
protection for architectural works. The proper analysis of architectural works 
has created a split in the federal appellate courts between the “categorical test” 
and the “dissection test.”92  
2. The Eleventh Circuit’s Categorical Test  
The Eleventh Circuit created the categorical test in Intervest 
Construction, Inc. v. Canterbury Estate Homes, Inc., which plainly limits 
copyright protection for architecture by stamping a “compilation” designation 
                                                                                                             
 87. See supra Part I.A.  
 88. H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 20–21, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 
6951–52 (“The Committee does not suggest, though, that in evaluating the 
copyrightability or scope of protection for architectural works, the Copyright 
Office or the courts should ignore functionality.”). Some examples of functional 
elements in architectural design may include the following: “structural members, 
spatial volumes, circulation, mechanical and electrical systems, and construction 
methods.” Gregory B. Hancks, Comment, Copyright Protection for Architectural 
Design: A Conceptual and Practical Criticism, 71 WASH. L. REV. 177, 192 
(1996). 
 89. H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 21, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6952.  
 90. See id. at 6952. The Report states that “[i]f the design elements are not 
functionally required, the work is protect[able] without regard to physical or 
conceptual separability.” Id. This statement is not clear. According to this 
sentence, Congress might apply the separability test to functional elements, which 
is in conflict with its ban on the use of separability in the analysis for architectural 
works.  
 91. See id. (“[T]he Copyright Office should issue a certificate of registration, 
letting the courts determine the scope of protection. In each case, the courts must 
be free to decide the issue upon the facts presented, free of the separability 
conundrum presented by the useful articles doctrine applicable for pictorial, 
graphic, and sculptural works.”); Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 
259 F.3d 25, 34 n.5 (1st Cir. 2001) (“The extent to which the [copyrighted work] 
contain[s] protected expression is a matter of law, determined by the court.”). 
 92. Compare Intervest Constr., Inc. v. Canterbury Estates Homes, Inc., 554 
F.3d 914 (11th Cir. 2008), with Zalewski v. Cicero Builder Dev., Inc., 754 F.3d 
95 (2d Cir. 2014). 
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on all architectural works.93 A “‘compilation’ is a work formed by the 
collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, 
coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole 
constitutes an original work of authorship.”94 Some examples of compilations 
include a directory compiled with information taken from the white pages,95 a 
book of poems,96 and a software company database.97 
The dispute in Intervest arose over an infringement claim by a builder that 
held a copyright in the design of a four-bedroom home.98 The builder claimed 
that another similarly arranged four-bedroom home design infringed on his 
copyright.99 The court began its analysis by proffering that all copyrightable 
works should be assigned to one of three categories: creative works, derivative 
works, or compiled works.100 The court categorized architectural works as 
compilations, relying on similarities between the statutory definitions of an 
architectural work and a compilation as well as the fact that the elements the 
Intervest plaintiff attempted to protect were all “common elements.”101 After 
finding that architectural works should be considered compilations, the court 
cited the Supreme Court case Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone 
Services Co.102 for the proposition that compilations are afforded “thin” 
                                                                                                             
 93. Intervest Constr., 554 F.3d at 919. 
 94. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).  
 95. See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
 96. See, e.g., Silverstien v. Penguin Putnam, Inc., 368 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 97. See, e.g., Maddison River Mgmt. Co. v. Bus. Mgmt. Software Corp., 387 
F. Supp. 2d 521 (M.D.N.C. 2005). 
 98. Intervest Constr., 554 F.3d at 916. 
 99. Id. The court went into painstaking detail to describe the differences and 
similarities between the two houses. For example:  
Each floor-plan depicts a four-bedroom house, with one bedroom being 
denominated as a ‘master’ bedroom or suite. Each floor plan includes a: 
two-car garage; living room; dining room; ‘family’ room; foyer; ‘master’ 
bathroom; kitchen; second bathroom; nook; and porch/patio. Each floor-
plan also reflects certain ‘elements’ common to most houses . . . .  
Id.  
 100. Id. at 919 n.3 (“An example of a creative work is a novel. An example of 
a derivative work is a screenplay based on a novel . . . . An example of a 
compilation is [the floor plans at issue in this case].” (quoting Warren Publ’g, Inc. 
v. Microdos Data Corp., 115 F.3d 1509, 1515 n.16 (11th Cir. 1997))).  
 101. Id. at 919. The court treated the “common elements” like “standard 
features” as defined by the statute and labeled rooms, windows, doors, and “other 
staple building components” as standard elements. Id. 
 102. 499 U.S. 340 (1991). In Feist, the plaintiff asserted copyright protection 
for a telephone book. Id. at 344. The Supreme Court found that protection could 
be afforded to the telephone book as a compilation, but only if the arrangement of 
the un-copyrightable elements was original. Id. at 358. The Court held that the 
arrangement was a standard alphabetical listing that furnished no protection under 
copyright. Id. at 358. 
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protection.103 A “thin” copyright “protects against only virtually identical 
copying,” which means that a modest dissimilarity is more significant than it 
would be for another, more robustly protected work.104 Thus, the court 
reasoned that the scope of copyright protection for all architectural works is 
exceedingly small, holding that protection should be “viewed through the 
narrow lens of compilation analysis.”105  
                                                                                                             
 103. Intervest Constr., 554 F.3d at 919. “Thin” protection is an infringement 
term that the Eleventh Circuit uses to define the scope of protection. Id. “Thin” in 
this context refers to the original contribution by the creator as being minimal. 
The Second Circuit equates “thin” protection to a slight contribution from the 
author. See Zalewski v. Cicero Builder Dev., Inc., 754 F.3d 95, 107 (2d Cir. 2014) 
(“[The architect’s] original contribution was slight—his copyright very thin.”). 
Other circuits have also used “thin” to describe the scope of protection. See, e.g., 
Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 812 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[Plaintiff]’s copyright on 
these original elements (or their combination) is ‘thin,’ however, comprising no 
more than his original contribution to ideas already in the public domain.”).  
 104. See, e.g., Satava, 323 F.3d at 812. The Intervest court does not define 
“thin” protection. See Intervest Constr., 554 F.3d at 921. Fiest also neglects to 
define “thin” protection but explains in the context of compilations it means that 
“[n]otwithstanding a valid copyright, a subsequent compiler remains free to use 
the facts contained in another’s publication to aid in preparing a competing work, 
so long as the competing work does not feature the same selection and 
arrangement.” Feist, 499 U.S. at 349; see also Transwestern Publ’g Co. v. 
Multimedia Mktg. Assoc., 133 F.3d 773, 776 (10th Cir. 1998) (“[I]f substantial 
similarity is the normal measure required to demonstrate infringement, 
‘supersubstantial’ similarity must pertain when dealing with ‘thin’ works.” 
(quoting NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 36, at § 13.03(A))); see also, Honeywell 
Int’l, Inc. v. W. Support Grp., Inc., 947 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1082 (D. Ariz. 2013) 
(A “thin” copyright “protects against only virtually identical copying.”).  
  For example, in Dream Custom Homes, Inc. v. Modern Day Construction, 
Inc., the court held that because architecture is only afforded “thin” protection, 
the architectural plans in question were not unique enough in overall design to 
outweigh the differences between to the two plans. 773 F. Supp. 2d 1288 (M.D. 
Fla. 2011). Similarly in Miller’s Ale House, Inc. v. Boynton Carolina Ale House, 
LLC, the Eleventh Circuit applied it’s compilation analysis stating that the 
differences between two restaurant designs were dramatic and overwhelming 
while the similarities were only broad and conceptual and included common 
features of a sports bar or restaurant. 702 F.3d 1312, 1326 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 105. Intervest Constr., 554 F.3d at 919. Other cases have also followed this 
line of reasoning. See, e.g., Miller’s Ale House, Inc., 702 F.3d at 1326; Jeff Benton 
Homes v. Ala. Heritage Homes, Inc., 929 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1252 (N.D. Ala. 
2013); Dream Custom Homes, Inc., 773 F. Supp. 2d at 1290; Harvester, Inc. v. 
Rule Joy Trammell Rubio, LLC, 716 F. Supp. 2d 428, 441 (E.D. Va. 2010). 
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3. The Second Circuit’s Dissection Test 
The Second Circuit criticized the Eleventh Circuit’s categorical test in 
Zalewski v. Cicero Builder Development, Inc.,106 another single-family-home 
copyright-infringement case.107 The court dismissed the plaintiff-architect’s 
copyright infringement claim against builders for continued use of his colonial 
home designs after the licenses granted had expired.108 The Zalewski plaintiff 
alleged that the defendants copied the “overall size, shape, and silhouette 
of his designs as well as the placement of rooms, windows, doors, closets, 
stairs, and other architectural features.”109 
The court asserted that not all artistic works are suited to categorical 
definitions and that the categories chosen by the Eleventh Circuit were 
inadequate for analyzing the scope of copyright protection.110 The court 
emphasized that at some level, all works of art are compilations of 
uncopyrightable individual elements—a painting is a compilation of 
uncopyrightable colors, a song is a compilation of uncopyrightable notes, and 
a book is a compilation of uncopyrightable words.111 The court further 
explained that the Eleventh Circuit’s analogy between the statutory definitions 
of a compilation and an architectural work was unsupported.112 Although both 
definitions speak of a work including the joining of uncopyrightable features, 
many of the other categories protected under the Copyright Act—such as 
literary works, sound recordings, motion pictures, and audio visual works—do 
as well.113 According to the Second Circuit, by labeling architectural works as 
                                                                                                             
 106. 754 F.3d at 103–04. 
 107. Id. at 109. Although the court announced a sweeping decision on the 
scope of copyright protection for architectural works, Zalewski provided a unique 
factual situation. The plaintiff filed four amended complaints and included 
numerous defendants in addition to the defendant architect firm (such as 
engineers, real estate agents, the owners of the alleged infringing home, etc.) then 
subsequently dismissed most defendants. Id. at 99. The Zalewski plaintiff’s 
actions may have pushed the court to apply a more rigorous application of the 
dissection test than the court would have in another factual circumstance. 
Nonetheless, Zalewski remains the law in the Second Circuit.  
 108. Id. at 102. 
 109. Id. at 99. 
 110. Id. at 103–04. 
 111. Id. at 103. 
 112. Id. at 104. 
 113. Id. at 103–04 (“[T]he statute defines ‘Literary works’ as ‘words, numbers, 
or other . . . symbols’ arranged in ‘books, periodicals’ or other media; ‘Sound 
Recordings’ as ‘a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds’; a ‘computer 
program’ as ‘a set of statements or instructions’; and ‘Motion Pictures’ and 
‘Audio Visual works’ as ‘series of related images.’” (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101 
(2012))). 
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compilations, the Eleventh Circuit dodged the real issue—creating a true scope 
of protection for architectural works.114  
The Zalewski court concluded that the central issue was whether the 
defendant’s copying was wrongful—whether the defendant copied protected 
elements of the plaintiff’s work.115 To answer this question and thus establish 
the scope of protection for the architectural works, the court focused on what 
is not afforded copyright protection: elements that either have utilitarian 
function or are unprotectable based on the scènes-à-faire or merger doctrines.116 
The court determined that many of the similarities between the two home 
designs at issue in the case were “a function of consumer expectations and 
standard house design” or were features of all colonial homes and lacked 
originality.117 The court, therefore, excluded the designs from protection on the 
basis of utilitarian function or scènes-à-faire.118 The court pointed out that the 
plaintiff did not “distinguish those aspects of his designs that were original to 
him from those dictated by the [the colonial style] in which he worked.”119 
The court concluded, therefore, that none of the elements copied by the 
defendants were within the scope of copyright protection.120  
                                                                                                             
 114. Id. (“The challenge . . . is not to determine whether a work is a creative 
work, a derivative work, or a compilation, but to determine what in it originated 
with the author and what did not.”). The court also noted that Intervest offered no 
definition of what made a feature “common.” Id. at 104. However, it is likely that 
by “common features,” the Intervest court was referring to “standard features.” 
 115. Id. at 100–02 (“[I]n many cases any copying of a work is wrongful, [but]. . . . 
[n]ot every portion or aspect of a copyrighted work is given copyright law’s protection. 
Copying these aspects of a work is not wrongful, and thus not all copying is 
wrongful.”). See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991); 
Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 813 (1st Cir. 1995). The court uses 
the infringement standard as a starting point for determining the scope of copyright 
protection. Zalewski, 754 F.3d at 100. Wrongful copying occurs only if the element in 
question was protected by copyright in the first place. Id. 
 116. Zalewski, 754 F.3d at 105–06. The court explained that when designing a 
home in a certain style, such as colonial style, the architect is bound by certain 
conventions. Id. at 106. The architect may not copyright those conventions 
because they are not original to the architect. Id. The court also gave the following 
example: “Great artists often express themselves through the vocabulary of 
existing forms. Shakespeare wrote his Sonnets; Brahms composed his Hungarian 
Dances; and Plaintiff designed his colonial houses. Because we must preserve 
these forms for future artists, neither iambic pentameter, nor European folk 
motifs, nor clapboard siding are copyrightable.” Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id.  
 119. Id. at 106. 
 120. Id. 
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III. FUNCTIONALITY, CATEGORIZATION, AND DISSECTION AND THEIR 
UNWARRANTED RIGOROUS APPLICATION 
Each of the three tests that a court may use to determine the scope of 
protection of an architectural work—non-functionality, categorical, and 
dissection—may produce acceptable results in the case of commonplace 
or “cookie-cutter” buildings in that they are unlikely to result in a finding 
of infringement short of exact copying.121 These types of buildings arguably 
deserve little to no protection because they are largely or entirely unoriginal 
in a copyright sense. However, inattentive application of these tests will lead 
to inadequate copyright protection for more creative and complex 
architecture. Inadequate protection, in turn, will undermine the 
constitutional aims of intellectual property law.122 Application of each of 
these tests may so limit the scope of protection for architectural works that 
architects are no longer encouraged to create works.123 The congressional 
non-functionality test incorporates the banished separability analysis, the 
Eleventh Circuit’s categorical test inappropriately categorizes architecture, 
and the Second Circuit’s dissection test requires careful attention to avoid 
overlooking original design aspects. 
A. Congress’s Non-Functionality Test: The Separability Test by a 
Different Name 
Congress adamantly renounced application of the separability test for 
architectural works yet inserted in the AWCPA House Report a non-
functionality requirement that is remarkably similar to the separability test. The 
first part of the test, which asks “whether there are original design elements 
present, including overall shape and interior architecture” is appropriate;124 
originality is the cornerstone of copyright law, and without originality, 
protection cannot exist.125 The difficulty arises with the second part of the 
test—the non-functionality requirement—when it is applied to the overall 
form of a work. All architectural works have some inherent functionality. 
Congress acknowledged as much by stating that its use of the word 
                                                                                                             
 121. See, e.g., Intervest Constr., Inc. v. Canterbury Estates Homes, Inc., 554 
F.3d 914 (11th Cir. 2008); Zalewski, 754 F.3d 95. 
 122. See supra Part I.A.  
 123. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“[Copyright] is intended 
definitely to grant valuable, enforceable rights to authors, publishers, etc., without 
burdensome requirements; to afford greater encouragement to the production of 
literary [or artistic] works of lasting benefit to the world.” (quoting Washingtonian 
Publ’g Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 36 (1939)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 124. H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 19 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
6935, 6951.  
 125. See supra Part I.A. 
2015] COMMENT 289 
 
 
 
“building” encompasses “habitable structures such as houses and office 
buildings” and “structures that are used, but not inhabited, by human 
beings.”126 Practically speaking, a court finding that a building’s overall 
form meets the non-functionality requirement would seem inconceivable, 
even if that form is original, because the overall form of most buildings is 
impossible to conceptually separate from its utilitarian function.127  
Under Congress’s non-functionality test, protection for buildings will 
only include protection of certain individual elements except in some 
extreme circumstances.128 For example, although a roof is functionally 
required because it keeps the inhabitants and interior safe from the elements, 
shaping a roof like a sheet of curved metal fabric is not required to 
functionally shield inhabitants from the elements. As a result, this sort of 
element design could pass the non-functionality test.129 A specific, original 
curved metal roof is a design choice not highly constrained by functional 
considerations. Instead, the architect likely chose that shape strictly for its 
aesthetic appeal. Although Congress’s test would provide copyright 
protection for the creative roof in this example, the underlying logic is, in 
essence, the conceptual separability test.130 The conceptual separability 
                                                                                                             
 126. H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 20, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 
6951 (emphasis added). Some examples of buildings provided by the House 
Report include: “churches, pergolas, gazebos, and garden pavilions.” Id. 
 127. See Shipley, supra note 46, at 426 (“[A]esthetic elements of some articles 
are so inextricably interwoven with the item’s utilitarian aspects that there are no 
features that can be separated conceptually, let alone physically, to stand alone as 
copyrightable works.”); see also James Bingham Bucher, Comment, Reinforcing 
the Foundation: The Case Against Copyright Protection for Works of Architecture, 
39 EMORY L.J. 1261, 1273–74 (1990) (“[M]ost works of architecture serve some 
definite utilitarian purpose, such as providing places to live, work, learn, and play. 
Yet these works often possess distinct aesthetic qualities as well.”). 
 128. For example, the Guggenheim, a well-known art museum located on the 
Upper East Side of Manhattan in New York City, is a design that could possibly 
pass Congress’s non-functionality requirement for overall form. The form has no 
functional value, as the building resembles a piece of art instead of a building. See 
Check Out These Interesting Photos of the Guggenheim Museum in New York, 
BOOMSBEAT, http://www.boomsbeat.com/articles/2161/20140415/check-out-these 
-interesting-photos-of-the-guggenheim-museum-in-new-york.htm [http://perma.cc 
/K74R-ND6X] (last visited March 28, 2015). 
 129. See Fisher Center for the Performing Arts, ABOUT, http://architecture 
.about.com/od/greatbuildings/ig/Buildings-by-Frank-Gehry/Fisher-Center.htm [http: 
//perma.cc/T3Y2-7M7J] (last visited Nov. 3, 2014). In fact, roofs are generally at 
triangular angles and shingled. Therefore, a creative roof design such as one inspired 
by fabric, passes both parts of Congress’s test—it demonstrates a spark of creativity 
by the architect and is therefore original and is not functionally required. 
 130. See, e.g., Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 
1145 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that application of the separability test “ultimately 
should depend on the extent to which the work reflects artistic expression 
uninhibited by functional considerations”).  
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test is simple when applied to this specific fabric-shaped roof; however, in 
other circumstances this test can be a difficult concept to apply.131 
Application is especially burdensome when, as in much of architecture, 
creative design elements are deeply intertwined with the functionality of 
the work.132 Furthermore, Congress expressly stated that the separability test 
should not be a part of the copyright protection analysis for architecture.133 
Application of the non-functionality requirement of Congress’s two-step test 
is essentially the banned separability test and will deny protection for overall 
form in almost all cases. Thus, courts should not rely on its logic in 
analyzing the scope of copyright protection for architectural works.  
B. Eleventh Circuit Categorical Test: Against the Intent of Congress and 
Generalized Notions of Copyright Law 
The Eleventh Circuit did not rely on Congress’s logic in developing its 
analysis; rather, the court created an alternative test that may be even less 
suitable for defining the scope of copyright protection than Congress’s non-
functionality test.134 By labeling architectural works as compilations, the 
Eleventh Circuit declined to answer the real question—how to adequately 
define the scope of copyright protection.135 Instead, the court only provided 
“thin” protection to architectural works without deciding what features should 
                                                                                                             
 131. See, e.g., Leicester v. Warner Bros., 232 F.3d 1212, 1223 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(labeling the test as “the quagmire of conceptual seperability [sic]”). 
 132. The House Report acknowledges the intertwining of function and 
aesthetics in architecture stating: “The key to the art of architecture is the 
conviction and sensitivity with which technology and function are interpreted 
aesthetically, in solutions of a practical social purpose.” H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, 
at 18 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6949 (quoting ADA LOUISE 
HUXTABLE, ARCHITECTURE, ANYONE?: CAUTIONARY TALES OF THE BUILDING 
ART (1986)). 
 133. Congress was clear on its intent to remove architecture from the 
separability test:  
By creating a new category of protect[able] subject matter in new section 
102(a)(8), and, therefore, by deliberately not encompassing architectural 
works as pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works in existing section 
102(a)(5), the copyrightability of architectural works shall not be evaluated 
under the separability test applicable to pictorial, graphic, or sculptural 
works embodied in useful articles. . . . There is considerable scholarly and 
judicial disagreement over how to apply the separability test, and the 
principal reason for not treating architectural works as pictorial, graphic, 
or sculptural works is to avoid entangling architectural works in this 
disagreement. 
H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 20, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6951 
(internal citations omitted). 
 134. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the Zalewski opinion’s thorough 
explanation of the flaws in the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis). 
 135. Zalewski v. Cicero Builder Dev., Inc., 754 F.3d 95, 104 (2d Cir. 2014).  
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or should not be protected.136 Despite being easier to apply, the Eleventh 
Circuit’s categorical approach is not consistent with the AWCPA. The 
definition of an architectural work specifically includes “the arrangement and 
composition of spaces and elements” but does not refer to architecture as a 
“compilation” as defined in the Copyright Act.137 The only way an 
architectural work could be considered a compilation is if an architect took 
two previously-designed or pre-fabricated homes that were intended to 
stand alone and connected them side-by-side. The compilation label 
should be reserved for actual compilations and not used to simplify the 
analysis for architectural works.  
Further, by categorically defining the protection of all architectural 
works as “thin,” the courts are requiring a finding of “super substantial 
similarity” or near exact copying for all architectural works.138 This type 
of “across-the-board” categorization is inappropriate for architecture, 
because the field of design varies greatly. By adopting this standard, a 
court would examine a complex and creative design, like the Taliesen, in 
the same manner as a more common design, like a four-bedroom colonial 
home. Under a thin protection regime, an unlawful copier could avoid 
infringement by simply changing window shapes or shutter colors or 
tweaking the floor plan of Taliesin. This result discourages creation and 
innovation in the field of architecture by limiting the scope of copyright 
protection.  
C. Second Circuit Dissection Method: Best Choice, but Still Not Perfect  
Compared to the Eleventh Circuit’s categorization, the Second Circuit 
stays true to the purpose of copyright protection through its dissection 
test.139 The test employs a process of elimination—elements not discarded 
based on the doctrines of scènes-à-faire and merger, functionality, or other 
public domain arguments are considered original to the architect and 
create the scope of protection.140 If an element does not pass the dissection 
test, that element is not original and the court does not consider that 
                                                                                                             
 136. Id. 
 137. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 138. See supra note 103. 
 139. Copyright is contingent on originality of expression. 17 U.S.C. § 102 
(“Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship fixed in any 
tangible medium of expression.”). The Second Circuit focused on protection for 
elements that were original to the architect. Zalewski, 754 F.3d at 104 (“The 
challenge in adjudicating copyright cases is not to determine whether a work is a 
creative work, a derivative work, or a compilation, but to determine what in it 
originated with the author and what did not.”). 
 140. See supra Part I.A (discussing the copyright doctrines).  
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element under the infringement analysis.141 For more common designs 
such as ordinary colonial homes—as was the case in Zalewski—this 
process alleviates the issue of standard features being available for future 
architects because the process places an emphasis on scrutinizing each 
individual element.142 This important and useful feature of the dissection 
test ensures progress in the field of architecture by leaving standard building 
blocks available for use in future designs. Further, the dissection test is 
aligned with the AWCPA, which specifically excludes standard features from 
copyright protection.143  
However, in many cases, mechanically following the dissection test will 
result in a premature elements analysis that ignores the originality of large-
scale groupings of elements144 and overall form.145 As one commentator 
suggests, “[t]he risk of a rigorous application of the subtractive [or dissection] 
approach is in missing the protectable forest for the unprotect[able] trees.”146 
In Zalewski, the Second Circuit ignored some potentially original aspects of 
the overall design of the home in favor of a simpler test: the work is 
categorically not protectable if some of the elements are based on a pre-
established style, which makes the work unoriginal to the author.147 Not only 
is this sort of categorical analysis reminiscent of the Eleventh Circuit’s 
                                                                                                             
 141. See supra note 116. 
 142. Zalewski, 754 F.3d at 97. 
 143. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).  
 144. Large scale groupings of elements are features of the building that are made 
up of many other elements and when taken as a whole could be considered original. 
See, e.g., John Morris Dixon, The Broad, ARCHITECT (Feb. 1, 2014), http://www 
.architectmagazine.com/cultural-projects/the-broad_o.aspx?dfpzone=awards.pa_a 
wards [http://perma.cc/7TFS-WQK9] (an entryway); Brooklyn Botanic Garden 
Visitor Center, ARCHITECT (Sept. 15, 2012), http://www.architectmagazine.com 
/projects/view/brooklyn-botanic-garden-visitor-center/528/ [http://perma.cc/3MDE 
-QM4Q] (a roof overhand); John Gendall, Cloverdale749, ARCHITECT (Dec. 18, 
2013), http://www.architectmagazine.com/multifamily/cloverdale749_o.aspx?dfp 
zone=general [http://perma.cc/ZA7W-SCK2] (a façade). One can further break 
down each of these features into elements that may or may not be protectable. When 
taken as a whole to form a large scale feature of the building, however, copyright 
protection may be appropriate.  
 145. See Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 979–80 (2d 
Cir. 1980) (“By factoring out similarities based on non-copyrightable elements, a 
court runs the risk of overlooking wholesale usurpation of a prior author’s 
expression.”); see also Shipley, supra note 9, at 41. 
 146. Shipley, supra note 9, at 41. 
 147. See Zalewski, 754 F.3d at 107 (“Although he undoubtedly spent many 
hours on his designs, and although there is certainly something of Plaintiff’s own 
expression in his work, as long as Plaintiff adhered to a pre-existing style his 
original contribution was slight—his copyright very thin. Only very close copying 
would have taken whatever actually belonged to Plaintiff.”). 
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flawed categorical test, but the analysis reaches an incorrect conclusion.148 
If the work is based on an established style, many design aspects are likely 
copies of that style, and, therefore, the overall form may not contain the 
requisite originality. The fact that a work is based on an established style, 
however, should not render the work categorically unprotectable. If originality 
is present in the work, the court should protect the work regardless of the source 
of the inspiration.149  
Although the court’s rigorous application of the dissection test may have 
produced acceptable results in the Zalewski case, the same rigorous application 
can produce unwanted results in complex cases. The Second Circuit’s 
dissection test ensures that courts do not remove standard features from the 
public domain for future architects and does not allow a monopoly over an 
established style. The courts need to apply the test flexibly, or else they will 
unintentionally leave unprotected the overall form of original works or large-
scale groupings of original.150 A careful application of the dissection test can 
be informed by the court’s treatment of other works that weave functionality 
into creative design.  
IV. SIMILAR COMPLEX WORKS OFFER INSIGHT INTO THE SCOPE OF 
PROTECTION FOR ARCHITECTURE 
Determining the boundaries of copyright protection in non-traditional 
areas of creative expression is not unique to architecture.151 Subject 
matters exist—especially in applied design—that Congress did not include 
in the original copyright acts but could aptly protect through copyright.152 
The Second Circuit has developed a specific dissection test for computer 
programs, which have similar inherent-functionality concerns as 
architectural works.153 In other areas that deal with inherently functional 
                                                                                                             
 148. A court does not categorically deny a colonial style home protection. Just 
because a certain style inspires an architect, does not preclude originality and to 
allow another to copy original expression of that style is against the principles of 
copyright law. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249–
52 (1903) (“Others are free to copy the original. They are not free to copy the 
copy.”). 
 149. Zalewski, 754 F.3d at 104 (“Courts should treat architectural copyrights 
no differently than other copyrights.”). The statute does not state whether courts 
should treat architectural works, as a subcategory of section 102, any differently 
than any of the other subcategories. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). The language is 
broad and inclusive. Id. (“Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of 
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”). 
 150. See the Taliesin discussion in the Introduction for an example of the risk 
of original elements of a unique work being left unprotected. 
 151. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 213 (1954). 
 152. Id. 
 153. See infra Part V.A. 
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works, such as with computer programs and industrial design, Congress 
has designed unique protection regimes that courts can tailor to avoid 
allowing overreaching copyrights that hinder progress and competition.154 
A. Computer Programs  
Computer programs enjoy the same copyright statutory protections as 
architecture under the “literary works” category.155 Computer programs 
consist of literal and non-literal components, both of which can be the subject 
of copyright protection.156 The code’s interaction with the computer hardware 
and operating system generates non-literal components.157 Examples of 
nonliteral elements of a computer program include its screen displays and the 
main menu.158 Literal elements are the object or binary code that the computer 
reads and the source code that a human creates and can read.159  
Like all copyrightable subject matter, protection for a computer program 
requires originality and does not include standard features.160 Computer 
                                                                                                             
 154. See infra Part V.B. 
 155. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
 156. Autoskill Inc. v. Nat’l Educ. Support Sys., Inc., 994 F.2d 1476 (10th Cir. 
1993); Computer Assocs. Int’l v. Altai, 982 F.2d 693, 702 (2d Cir. 1992) (“[I]f 
the non-literal structures of literary works are protected by copyright; and if 
computer programs are literary works, as we are told by the legislature; then the 
non-literal structures of computer programs are protected by copyright.”); 
Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phx. Control Sys., Inc., 886 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 
1989) (“Nonliteral components of computer software [such as structure, sequence 
and organization and user interface] may be protected by copyright where they 
constitute expression, rather than ideas.”); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin 
Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983) (computer code expressed in 
object code or embedded in an electronic read-only memory device can be the 
subject of a copyright). 
 157. MiTek Holdings v. Arce Eng’g Co., 89 F.3d 1548, 1555 n.15 (11th Cir. 
1996). 
 158. Id. 
 159. See, e.g., Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 
522, 533 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 160. ATC Distrib. Grp., Inc. v. Whatever It Takes Transmissions & Parts, Inc., 
402 F.3d 700 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that automobile parts cataloging program 
was not copyrightable as the sole way of expressing those ideas, invoking the 
merger doctrine); Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 329 F.3d 923 (7th Cir. 
2003) (holding that tables in computer program were copyrightable because 
configuration was avoidable and many other options remained); Montegomery v. 
Noga, 168 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that computer program improving 
features of earlier versions was sufficiently original to obtain protection); MiTek 
Holdings, 89 F.3d at 1557 (holding that drafting program’s command structure 
was not copyrightable because it was a basic industry standard process equally 
performable as hand calculation); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 
807 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that computer menu command hierarchy was not a 
copyrightable subject matter as a “method of operation”); Apple Computer Inc. v. 
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programs, like architectural works, are inherently functional and blur the line 
between idea and expression.161 When analyzing the copyrightability of 
computer programs, courts rule out features dictated by outside forces.162 For 
architecture, the external forces are consumer preferences and engineering 
standards, although for computer programs, external factors include 
hardware standards and mechanical specifications.163 In determining the 
scope of protection for computer programs, courts utilize the familiar 
doctrines of scènes-à-faire and merger.164 Courts have also held, like 
                                                                                                             
Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that graphic user interface 
consisting only of basic ideas and their obvious expressions was not copyrightable); 
Eng’g Dynamics v. Structural Software, 26 F.3d 1335 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that 
engineering problem-solving program requiring large amounts of user input was 
copyrightable based on uniqueness, originality, and existence of other dissimilar 
products on the market designed for the same function); Apple Computer, Inc. v. 
Formula Int’l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 525 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that operating 
system was copyrightable, because the idea it expressed was capable of other 
modes of expression). 
 161. Computer Assocs. Int’l, 982 F.2d at 704 (“The essentially utilitarian 
nature of a computer program further complicates the task of distilling its idea 
from its expression. In order to describe both computational processes and 
abstract ideas, its content ‘combines creative and technical expression.’ . . . 
[C]ompared to aesthetic works, computer programs hover even more closely to 
the elusive boundary line described in § 102(b).” (internal quotations omitted)); 
see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 57 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5659, 5670 (“Section 102(b) is intended, among other things, to make clear that 
the expression adopted by the programmer is the copyrightable element in a 
computer program, and that the actual processes or methods embodied in the 
program are not within the scope of the copyright law.”); Daniel Su, Note, 
Substantial Similarity and Architectural Works: Filtering Out “Total Concept 
and Feel”, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1851, 1876–79 (2007) (providing an extensive 
discussion of the similarities between architecture and user-interface designs). 
 162. See, e.g., Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., 9 F.3d 823, 838 (10th 
Cir. 1993) (“In the area of computer programs these external factors may include: 
hardware standards and mechanical specification.”).  
 163. Id. 
 164. See, e.g., Incredible Techs., Inc. v. Virtual Techs., Inc., 400 F.3d 1007, 
1015 (7th Cir. 2005) (“In presenting a realistic video golf game, one would, by 
definition, need golf courses, clubs, a selection menu, a golfer, a wind meter, etc. 
Sand traps and water hazards are a fact of life for golfers, real and virtual. . . . As 
such, the video display is afforded protection only from virtually identical 
copying.”); Lexmark Int’l, 387 F.3d at 535 (“For computer programs, ‘if the 
patentable process is embodied inextricably in the line-by-line instructions of the 
computer program . . . then the process merges with the expression and precludes 
copyright protection.’” (quoting Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 
F.2d 832, 839–40 (Fed. Cir. 1992))); Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer 
Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 617 (7th Cir. 1982) (“The maze and scoring table are 
standard game devices, and the tunnel exits are nothing more than the commonly 
used ‘wrap around’ concept adapted to a maze-chase game.”). 
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architecture, that even if the whole program is not protectable, pieces of 
the program may be.165  
Also similar to architecture, the federal appellate courts have 
developed two alternative tests for the scope of protection for computer 
programs.166 The first test, known as the structure, sequence, and 
organization test arose in the Third Circuit.167 The first step of this test is to 
determine the purpose of the program.168 The purpose or function of the 
work is analogous to the work’s idea, and courts consider all elements that 
are not necessary to that purpose the protectable expression.169 Stated 
differently, if other means of reaching the defined purpose exist, then the 
chosen method is expression, not idea, and thus is copyrightable.170 Some 
courts have followed this method,171 but courts more often criticize than 
adopt this test.172 Critics claim that a structure, sequence, and organization 
analysis “casts too broad a net” by assuming that there is only one idea that 
underlies a program and that the one purpose will be easily identified.173  
Applied to architecture, this test may become useful when a work is 
created under an established style, such as a colonial-styled home.174 The 
identified purpose would be the colonial style. Anything in the design that 
courts do not consider part of the colonial style would be copyrightable as 
long as the design element met the originality requirement. Outside of this 
context, this test does not have merit in the analysis for architectural 
                                                                                                             
 165. Softel, Inc. v. Dragon Med. & Sci. Commc’ns, Inc., 118 F.3d 955, 964 
(2d Cir. 1997); BUC Int’l Corp. v. Int’l Yacht Council Ltd., 489 F.3d 1129 (11th 
Cir. 2007). 
 166. Compare Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 
(3d Cir. 1986), with Computer Assocs. Int’l, 982 F.2d 693. 
 167. Whelan Assocs., 797 F.2d at 1224. 
 168. Id. at 1236. 
 169. Id.  
 170. Micro Consulting, Inc. v. Zubeldia, 813 F. Supp. 1514, 1526 (W.D. Okla. 
1990). 
 171. Bull HN Info. Sys., Inc. v. Am. Express Bank Ltd., No. 88 CIV. 2103 
(SWK), 1990 WL 48098, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 1990); Broderbund Software, 
Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1133 (N.D. Cal. 1986); see also 
Kepner-Tregoe, Inc. v. Leadership Software, Inc., 12 F.3d 527, 535 (5th Cir. 
1994) (referring to the test with approval); Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. 
Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 832–33 (10th Cir. 1993) (finding the test to be useful, but 
instead employing the alternative test).  
 172. Computer Assocs. Int’l v. Altai, 982 F.2d 693, 705 (2d Cir. 1992) 
(providing a summary of the discontent over the test in the academic community). 
 173. Id. (“[A] computer program’s ultimate function or purpose is the composite 
result of interacting subroutines. Since each subroutine is itself a program, and thus, 
may be said to have its own ‘idea,’ Whelan’s general formulation that a program’s 
overall purpose equates with the program’s idea is descriptively inadequate.”).  
 174. Many single-family homes are based on some traditional style. Because 
most litigation occurs over single-family homes, this test could have far reaching 
effects if adopted. See supra Part.III.B. 
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works. Just as the critics of the test for computer programs have stated, 
identifying the specific purpose of a work is difficult if not impossible.175  
The more widely applied test for determining the scope of copyright 
protection for computer programs is the abstraction-filtration-comparison 
test.176 In Computer Associates International v. Altai,177 the Second Circuit 
devised a three-step test that is similar to the dissection test used in 
Zalweski.178 The first step, abstraction, “recognizes that any given work 
may consist of a mixture of numerous ideas and expressions.”179 Similar 
to reverse engineering, the court dissects the program by retracing the 
steps of the program designer and breaking down each level of the 
hierarchy of the program.180 The second step, filtration, requires 
examining each abstraction task and determining whether including that 
task at that level could be considered an unprotectable idea based on 
efficiency, necessity, external factors, or public domain elements.181 This 
filtration step serves “the purpose of defining the scope of plaintiff’s 
copyright.”182 The final step is the comparison step, which involves 
comparing the “golden nugget”—those elements that courts do not 
consider to be ideas dictated by efficiency or necessity or taken from the 
public domain—with the infringing work.183 The abstraction-filtration-
comparison test is the most accepted analysis for computer programs.184 
                                                                                                             
 175. See Computer Assoc. Int’l, 982 F.2d at 705. 
 176. See infra note 184 (listing the courts that have followed this method). 
 177. 982 F.2d 693. 
 178. Id. at 703. 
 179. Id. at 707 (quoting 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 36 at § 13.03[F]). 
 180. For example, take a program that identifies all of the even numbers of a 
set of input numbers and then multiplies them together. The highest level of 
abstraction would be the idea for the program itself: to identify even numbers and 
multiply them. Then the program can be broken down into three main subtasks: 
(1) decide if a number is even, (2) multiply the set of even numbers, and (3) output 
the answer. Moving further away from abstraction, within these subtasks, other 
subtasks exist. For subtask (1), one possible sub-subtask would include dividing 
each inputted number by two and a second sub-subtask would be determining if 
the resulting number was a fraction or not. At this sub-subtask level, the program 
would be at its least abstract. 
 181. Computer Assocs. Int’l, 982 F.2d at 707. 
 182. Id. (quoting Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 
1475 (9th Cir.)). 
 183. Id. at 710. 
 184. See Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014); 
Computer Mgmt. Assistance Co. v. Robert F. DeCastro, Inc., 220 F.3d 396 (5th 
Cir. 2000); Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532 (11th Cir. 1996); Autoskill 
Inc. v. Nat’l Educ. Support Sys., Inc., 994 F.2d 1476 (10th Cir. 1993); Gates 
Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823 (10th Cir. 1993); Baystate 
Tech., Inc. v. Bentley Sys., Inc., 946 F. Supp. 1079 (D. Mass. 1996). Cf. Lotus 
Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, 49 F.3d 807, 815 (1st Cir. 1995) (“While the Altai 
test may provide a useful framework for assessing the alleged nonliteral copying 
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The abstraction-filtration-comparison test mirrors the approach that 
the Second Circuit in Zalewski takes: pick apart the design, throw out what 
falls under public domain, necessity, or idea categories, and then analyze 
what is left—the “golden nugget.”185 This analysis was adapted for a 
computer program that has parts that can be examined independently. Most 
of the program’s sub-levels are essentially programs themselves; dissecting 
a program still leaves pieces of a program to analyze. Therefore, the risk of 
leaving original overall forms unprotected is likely less of a problem for 
computer programs than for architecture. When an architectural work is 
dissected, the analysis will generally turn on individual elements that are not 
themselves architectural works. Carefully applying this method, however, 
can be appropriate for defining the scope of protection for elements of 
architectural works when overall form lacks the requisite originality. Courts 
should use the computer-programming cases that have utilized the 
abstraction-filtration-comparison test as illustrations when analyzing 
copyright protection for individual elements of architectural works.  
B. Industrial Design 
Although courts’ treatment of copyright protection for computer 
programming offers guidance on applying the originality standard to 
architectural works, a specialized form of protection could avoid the non-
functionality issues altogether. Congress has the ability to extend “various 
forms of limited protection to industrial design” and has done so through sui 
generis protection for special types of intellectual property.186 Sui generis 
protection affords copyright-like protection for a limited duration—ten 
years.187 This type of protection strikes a balance between ensuring that 
functional works are not removed from the public domain and incentivizing 
continued innovation.188 The standard for originality is generally the same, 
                                                                                                             
of computer code, we find it to be of little help in assessing whether the literal 
copying of a menu command hierarchy constitutes copyright infringement.”). 
 185. Compare Computer Assocs. Int’l, 982 F.2d at 707 with Zalewski v. Cicero 
Builder Dev., Inc., 754 F.3d 95, 106 (2d Cir. 2014). The court’s approach for 
architectural work is likely based on the approach for computer programs, which 
came 22 years prior from the same circuit.  
 186. Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 167 (1989). Sui 
generis protection is a specialized protection scheme to protect rights that fall 
outside the traditional copyright doctrine. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1572 (9th 
ed. 2009). 
 187. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 904(b) (2012) (ten-year protection for semi-
conductor chips); 17 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (ten-year protection for boat hulls). 
 188. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 98–781, at 5–11 (1984), reprinted in 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5750, 5754–60 (“From a Congressional perspective, the unique 
problems posed by the need to reward creativity, encourage innovation, research 
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but the non-functionality requirement is relaxed.189 Some products that 
have sui generis of protection include semi-conductor chips and boat 
hulls.190 In those areas, the creation of the work requires strenuous effort 
and the work is vulnerable to copying, but the inherent functionality of the 
product limits the availability of copyright protection.191 
Sui generis protection is a possible remedy to the current ambiguities in 
the area of architectural protection. Relying on past works for inspiration is 
a widely accepted practice in architecture, which is often a deterring factor 
in affording full duration copyright protection for architectural works.192 If 
Congress shortened the duration of the protection, courts may be less 
hesitant to extend the scope of copyright protection. Therefore, strenuous 
tests like the Second Circuit’s dissection test would be unnecessary. 
Congress could even define the originality standard for architecture as 
something higher than a spark.193 That way, truly creative works would be 
protected while mundane, standard designs such as the four-bedroom homes 
in Zaleswki and Intervest would be excluded from protection.  
Customizable protection could be the answer to the complex question 
of copyright protection for architectural works. However, the Berne 
Convention requires that architectural works retain full term copyright 
protection—life of the author plus 50 years.194 Therefore, if Congress were 
to amend the Copyright Act to exclude architectural works from full-term 
copyright protection, the United States would be in violation of the Berne 
                                                                                                             
and investment in the semiconductor industry while at the same time protecting 
the interest of the public has called for unique solutions.”). 
 189. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 1301, 1302 (“The designer or other owner of an 
original design of a useful article which makes the article attractive or distinctive 
in appearance to the purchasing or using public may secure the protection . . . .”).  
 190. 17 U.S.C. § 902 (1985) (semiconductor chips); 17 U.S.C. § 1301 (2008) 
(boat hulls).  
 191. See, e.g., Regan E. Keebaugh, Intellectual Property and the Protection of 
Industrial Design: Are Sui Generis Protection Measures the Answer to Vocal 
Opponents and a Reluctant Congress?, 13 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 255, 260 (2005) 
“Many reasons have been given in support of protecting industrial design” 
including “that strong design protection will lead to increased innovation and 
creativity by providing designers with an economic incentive to develop better 
products.” Id. But “the consensus among intellectual property scholars and 
industrial designers” is that neither copyright, patent, nor trademark law “provides 
a level of protection that adequately serves the needs of the design community.” 
Id. 
 192. See Su, supra note 161, at 1858–59 (discussing examples of great 
architectural works derived from other works and the practice of apprenticeships 
in the architectural field); see also Mow, supra note 35, at 868 (“Architecture is a 
profession that has largely accepted an architect’s general borrowing or imitation 
of another’s ideas.”). 
 193. See supra note 27. 
 194. See supra note 64.  
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Convention. Although sui generis protection is especially enticing, non-
compliance with the Berne Convention is likely not a viable route. 
Therefore, courts should look to the treatment of computer programs as a 
model for architectural works with some adjustments based on the need to 
protect overall form of architectural works. 
V. PUTTING THE HOUSE BACK TOGETHER AGAIN 
Although the other areas that grapple with inherently functional works are 
informative and three tests have been proffered for copyright analysis, courts 
are still left with an unclear standard for determining the scope of protection 
for architectural works. The low originality standard for copyright stands in 
contrast to the inherent functionality of architectural works and the long-
standing practice of architects “borrowing” from existing designs. Some have 
argued that functionality and accepted inspirational borrowing are 
insurmountable hurdles to copyright protection, and thus Courts should not 
afford architecture protection at all.195 In fact, the Eleventh Circuit comes quite 
close to this conclusion with its categorical test that ensures all architecture is 
protected only from near-exact copying.196 Not only is this position contrary to 
the wide breadth of protection afforded to other types of copyright-protected 
works, but the position is also in opposition to the intent of Congress.197 
Congress made clear that courts should afford architecture full copyright 
protection, but limited the scope of protection to non-functional aspects of the 
work.198 This non-functionality requirement does not level with Congress’s 
ban on the separability test. Defining the elements of a building, especially its 
overall form, is impossible without considering its functional aspects. This 
reasoning—filtering out the functional aspects of a work—is the separability 
test that Congress itself found inappropriate for architectural works by pulling 
architectural works out from under the “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural” 
works category.199 Courts are limited to deciding whether to follow Congress’s 
non-functionality requirement or its ban on the separability test.  
Instead, courts should use the Second Circuit’s dissection test, with 
some modifications, when faced with a copyright infringement case for 
architectural works. The dissection test offers an analytical approach to 
dealing with functional elements that are inherent in the form of the work 
and ensures that standard elements of architectural design are available for 
future architects. A strict application of the dissection test, however, could 
leave the overall form of the building and even some original elements 
                                                                                                             
 195. See Bucher, supra note 127. 
 196. See supra Part IV.B. 
 197. See supra Part III.A. 
 198. Id. 
 199. See supra Part I.B. 
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without protection. To remedy this issue, courts should add a specific step 
to the dissection test for architectural works and apply the dissection 
method less rigorously. Courts should first analyze the overall form of the 
building, and then analyze the individual elements under the dissection 
method.  
A. Step One: Protecting the Original Overall Form  
When utilizing the modified dissection method, the initial inquiry the 
courts should ask is whether the overall form of the building demonstrates 
a recognizably, non-trivial variation.200 Courts should analyze overall form 
first because an architectural work is often more complex than other artistic 
endeavors and is composed of “numerous aesthetic decisions” designed to 
create a whole.201 An architect combines excerption, modification, and 
arrangement of public-domain compositions with “the development and 
representation of wholly new motifs and the use of texture and color, etc.” 
to form the finished product.202 For example, the beauty in a gothic 
cathedral is not in any one pointed arch but in the relationship between 
hundreds of pointed arches of varying sizes and degrees. An architect’s 
work is most reflected through the whole rather than individual features. 
Further, by examining the work as a whole and not as a set of dissected 
                                                                                                             
 200. Kamar Int’l, Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 657 F.2d 1059, 1061 (9th Cir. 
1981) (“Anyone can copyright anything, if he adds something original to its 
expression.”); Yankee Candle Co. v. New Eng. Candle Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 154, 
158 (D. Mass. 1998) (“Courts have routinely protected modern architectural 
structures, such as commercial homes, that possess the minimal amount of 
originality that copyright law requires . . . .”). 
 201. Tufenkian Imp./Exp. Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d 
127, 134 (2d Cir. 2003); see H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 18 (1990), reprinted in 
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6949 (“The phrase ‘arrangement and composition of 
spaces and elements’ recognizes that: (1) creativity in architecture frequently 
takes the form of a selection, coordination, or arrangement of unprotect[able] 
elements into an original, protectable whole; (2) an architect may incorporate new, 
protect[able] design elements into otherwise standard, unprotect[able] building 
features; and (3) interior architecture may be protected.”); see also T-Peg, Inc. v. 
Vt. Timber Works, Inc., 459 F.3d 97, 115 (1st Cir. 2006) (“Copyright protection 
exists . . . in the architectural work taken as a whole”); Cornerstone Home 
Builders, Inc. v. McAllister, 303 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1320 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (“This 
distinguishing ‘look and feel’ . . . is subject to protection.”); Arthur Rutenberg 
Homes v. Maloney, 891 F. Supp. 1560, 1566 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (“[L]ike all modern 
homes, [the designs in question] are comprise[d] of many standard features (e.g., 
doors, windows, a staircase), the overall arrangement of these features, all of 
which provide a ‘look’ and ‘feel’ to a home, distinguishes [the designs] from other 
homes.”); MATTHEW FREDERICK, 101 THINGS I LEARNED IN ARCHITECTURE 
SCHOOL 51 (2007) (“Beauty is due more to harmonious relationships among the 
elements of a composition than to the elements themselves.”). 
 202. Tufenkian Imp./Exp. Ventures, 338 F.3d at 134. 
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features, courts will stay true to the definition of architecture in the AWCPA, 
which states that an architectural work includes “overall form as well as 
the arrangement and composition of spaces and elements.”203  
That courts should protect the overall form of an architectural work is 
a logical conclusion.204 How much protection courts should give the 
overall form, however, is what has animated the courts. Architecture is 
unique from other types of works protected by copyright in that drawing 
inspiration from existing designs is an acceptable practice.205 Therefore, 
one of the reasons that courts struggle with affording protection to 
buildings is because that protection would hinder the work of future 
architects contrary to the constitutional mandate that copyright promote 
progress in the arts. Clearly, if a court affords a four-bedroom colonial 
home copyright protection, not every architect who wishes to design a 
four-bedroom colonial home should have to pay a licensing fee. But when 
affording protection to overall form, courts run the risk of monopolizing 
entire styles of architecture.  
The infringement standard—substantially similar—does not clarify 
the issue. For example, all colonial homes will be substantially similar to 
one another. If that is the standard, once the first colonial home is 
copyrighted, all subsequent designs will be at risk for infringement. To 
adequately provide protection for the overall form of truly unique designs, 
courts must rethink the substantially similar standard for infringement 
based on the type of work.  
The level of protection for overall form should be on a sliding scale 
ranging from the “thin” protection that requires near identical copying or 
“super substantial similarity” to the normal substantially similar standard.206 
The more unique the building, the higher the protection the overall form should 
receive. For example, the overall form of the Taliesen should receive 
protection from copying that results in a substantially similar work while a 
four-bedroom colonial home should receive protection only from near-exact 
copying. Courts have recognized the need to deviate from the substantial 
similarity test when a work has “both protect[able] and unprotect[able] 
elements,” which is often the case with architecture.207 Therefore, courts must 
decide the level of copying necessary to constitute infringement based on the 
creativity of the overall form. The sliding scale of protection acknowledges 
                                                                                                             
 203. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 204. Id. 
 205. See supra note 192.  
 206. See supra note 103; see also Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. Simone 
Dev. Corp., 602 F.3d 57, 66–68 (2d Cir. 2010) (providing an example of the court 
applying the substantial similarity standard to the overall feel of a building). 
 207. Fisher-Price, Inc. v. Well-Made Toy Mfg. Corp., 25 F.3d 119, 123 (2d 
Cir. 1994). 
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that courts should protect the overall form of an architectural work while 
ensuring that less creative overall forms do not disrupt innovation in the field. 
This analysis would also specifically outlaw the categorical test. Instead of 
inappropriately applying the substantial similarity standard across the board, 
this test recognizes the need to accommodate the wide range of complexities 
and originality in architecture.  
Analyzing the overall form first is a necessary step; courts must 
vigilantly avoid applying the dissection test prematurely by analyzing 
elements in a vacuum for originality.208 As the Second Circuit has noted, 
“[b]y factoring out similarities based on non-copyrightable elements, a 
court runs the risk of overlooking wholesale usurpation of a prior author’s 
expression.”209 The aim is not to solely protect features such as ornate 
shutters or artistic chimney shapes, but rather to protect an architect’s 
entire work while leaving standard features free for future innovation. 
Some architectural works, however, do not have an original overall form, 
but may still contain original elements. Likewise, those that do have an 
original overall form may still have specific elements that deserve 
copyright protection.210 Therefore, the next step in determining the scope 
of copyright protection is to apply the Second Circuit’s dissection test and 
analyze individual elements for protection. 
B. Step Two: Protecting Individual Elements  
The dissection test focuses on originality through a process of 
elimination to ensure that overreaching copyrights do not hinder future 
architectural innovation.211 By factoring out features that are solely a function 
                                                                                                             
 208. Peter F. Gaito Architecture, 602 F.3d at 66 (“[W]e have disavowed any 
notion that we are required to dissect the works into their separate components, and 
compare only those elements which are in themselves copyrightable.” (quoting 
Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd. Inc., 71 F.3d 996, 1002 (2d Cir. 1995) (internal 
quotation marks omitted))).  
 209. Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 979–80 (2d Cir. 
1980).  
 210. See T-Peg, Inc. v. Vt. Timber Works, Inc., 459 F.3d 97, 115 (1st Cir. 
2006) (copyright protection can exist in portions of a work); Axelrod & Cherveny 
Architects, P.C. v. T. & S. Builders, Inc., 943 F. Supp. 2d 357, 362 (E.D.N.Y. 
2013) (“Infringement can be established on the basis of infringing either the floor 
plans or the exterior, or both.” (quoting Richmond Homes Mgmt., Inc. v. Raintree, 
Inc., 862 F. Supp. 1517, 1527 (W.D. Va. 1994))); see also Nikanov v. Simon & 
Schuster, Inc., 246 F.2d 501, 504 (2d Cir. 1957) (“While only a part of the 
plaintiff’s copyrighted work was appropriated, what was taken was clearly 
material, as the district court found.”); H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 18 (1990), 
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6949 (Those “individual features that 
reflect the erchitect’s [sic] creativity” are protectable under the act.). 
 211. See supra Part I.  
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of necessity or societal expectations, courts can use a near-objective approach 
in deciding whether an element deserves copyright protection at all. A helpful 
tool for the courts when deciding this threshold question for works designed in 
a specific style—such as the designs in Zalewski and Intervest—is the Third 
Circuit’s structure, sequence, and organization test used in the analysis for 
computer programs.212 This test would allow the court to objectively decide if 
certain features were scènes-à-faire to the style the architect was working in or 
if the elements were creative.  
Courts should carefully apply this process of elimination. If the court too 
rigorously defines the public domain, original features can go unprotected. The 
test cannot be that rigid and some flexibility must exist in its application. 
Therefore, courts will necessarily decide the dissection test on an ad hoc basis. 
Although this type of approach may decrease predictability, the courts will still 
have a more standardized test than is currently available. By inserting 
flexibility into the dissection test, courts will ensure that no truly creative 
element will go unprotected.  
After dissecting the building and factoring out the unprotectable, courts 
will apply the substantial similarity standard to individual elements. The 
sliding scale for the infringement analysis is not particularly helpful for the 
dissection method because elements are generally not as complex as overall 
form.213 With elements, tying up entire styles is less likely and copying 
becomes more obvious. For example, comparing two entire buildings is much 
more complex and less obvious than comparing two window shapes.  
By first analyzing overall form and then applying a modified version of 
the Second Circuit’s dissection test for the elements, courts are better equipped 
to protect original works of architecture without destroying the industries’ 
practice of inspirational borrowing or hindering progress and competition. This 
entire process gives more structure and guidance to the courts when deciding 
infringement cases over architectural works. 
CONCLUSION 
As one commentator has noted, “[a] proper building grows naturally and 
logically, and poetically out of all its conditions.”214 Architectural works are a 
unique category of copyright subject matter in that they fuse function and 
aesthetics within complex works.215 Because the works are so complex and 
                                                                                                             
 212. See supra Part III.A. 
 213. When courts analyze large scale elements, however, the courts should 
lean on the same sliding scale for infringement as used for overall form. These 
large scale elements present some of the same complexity issues. 
 214. FREDERICK, supra note 201, at 30. 
 215. See Shipley, supra note 46, at 426 (“[A]esthetic elements of some articles 
are so inextricably interwoven with the item’s utilitarian aspects that there are no 
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consist of many elements, only analyzing those elements as individual features 
and missing the protectable overall form or grouping of elements of the 
building is an easy mistake to make.216 The three alternative tests—Congress’s 
functionality test, the Eleventh Circuit’s categorization analysis, and the 
Second Circuit’s dissection method—all may produce agreeable results when 
applied to common architectural works such as typical single-family homes.217 
But rigid or inattentive application of even the most doctrinally sound of these 
tests, the dissection method, could lead to an original overall form or original 
large-scale grouping of elements being denied protection.218 Originality is the 
cornerstone of copyright law and courts should focus first on the originality of 
the overall form of the work.219 Then, the courts should turn to a flexible 
application of the dissection method to protect individual elements of the 
work.220 Focusing first on originality of the overall form ensures that original 
works of architecture are fully protected while the dissection method protects 
individual original elements. These two inquiries together ensure that no 
original aspect of an architectural work is left open to unlawful copying while 
guaranteeing progress and competition in the field of architecture.  
 
Lauren Jean Bradberry* 
  
                                                                                                             
features that can be separated conceptually, let alone physically, to stand alone as 
copyrightable works.”); see also Bucher, supra note 127, at 1273–74 (“[M]ost 
works of architecture serve some definite utilitarian purpose, such as providing 
places to live, work, learn, and play. Yet these works often possess distinct 
aesthetic qualities as well.”). 
 216. See supra Part III.C.  
 217. See supra Part III. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Copyright is contingent on originality of expression. 17 U.S.C. § 102 
(2012) (“Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship fixed 
in any tangible medium of expression . . . .”). An approach that disregards 
originality is inapposite to the purposes of copyright protection. 
 220. H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 18 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
6935, 6949; see also T-Peg, Inc. v. Vt. Timber Works, Inc., 459 F.3d 97, 115 (1st 
Cir. 2006) (holding that copyright protection can exist in portions of a work); 
Nikanov v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 246 F.2d 501, 504 (2d Cir. 1957) (“While 
only a part of the plaintiff's copyrighted work was appropriated, what was taken 
was clearly material, as the district court found.”). 
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